Similarities and Disagreements between Andrew Fuyarchuk’s dissertation, "The Positive Task for Theology in Heidegger’s ‘Philosophy of Being,’" and Laurence Paul Hemming’s book "Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice."
by Victor_Mtz · 60 things on NewTwos
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- Similarities
- Both works explore Heidegger’s relationship with theology, particularly his rejection of traditional Christian metaphysics, and attempt to interpret his existential philosophy in light of theological themes. However, their treatment of Heidegger’s atheism, the critique of ontotheology, and how Heidegger relates to theology and metaphysics, show deep intersections.
- Here’s a substantial expansion of the similarities between the two works:
- Heidegger’s Rejection of Ontotheology and Traditional Metaphysics
- Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming emphasize Heidegger’s critique and rejection of traditional Christian metaphysics, particularly in terms of what Heidegger calls “ontotheology.”
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk focuses on how Heidegger challenges the metaphysical tradition of Western thought, which culminates in a theologically framed understanding of Being, where God is posited as the highest being or causa sui. This theological framework, inherited from medieval Scholasticism and rooted in Aristotelian metaphysics, is criticized by Heidegger for reducing Being to a calculable, objective presence. Fuyarchuk underscores that Heidegger’s project seeks to go beyond this traditional metaphysical conception and develop a more fundamental inquiry into Being itself, independent of the theological interpretations that had previously dominated Western thought.
- Hemming’s Position: Similarly, Hemming dedicates significant attention to Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, which he defines as the philosophical attempt to understand Being by positing God as the ultimate ground and explanation of all that exists. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming argues that Heidegger sees this metaphysical understanding of God as the highest being as a fundamental error, one that obscures a more original encounter with Being. For Hemming, Heidegger’s atheism is precisely a rejection of this kind of theological explanation, which has dominated Western thought since the time of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Hemming interprets Heidegger’s project as a deliberate move away from the ontotheological structure that equates God with Being.
- KEY SIMILARITY: Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming agree that Heidegger’s philosophy rejects the traditional metaphysical framework in which God is posited as the ultimate ground or cause of Being. They both emphasize Heidegger’s critique of how this theological approach has dominated Western metaphysics and concealed a more fundamental understanding of Being. For both, Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology is central to his project, and they agree that Heidegger’s existential philosophy represents a decisive break with the theological foundations of metaphysics.
- The Critique of the Western Philosophical Tradition
- Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming recognize that Heidegger’s rejection of theology is tied to a broader critique of the Western philosophical tradition, particularly its focus on concepts like substance, presence, and essence, which have been influenced by theological categories.
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk details Heidegger’s critique of the Western tradition, tracing it back to the early Greek philosophers, particularly Parmenides and Aristotle. Fuyarchuk notes that Heidegger believes that the entire tradition of Western metaphysics has been influenced by a theological framing that prioritizes stable, eternal forms (such as God or the ousia of beings) over the more fluid, dynamic reality of Being. This critique is extended to Christian theology, which, according to Fuyarchuk’s interpretation of Heidegger, has imposed rigid, static categories on the experience of Being. Fuyarchuk explores how Heidegger seeks to overturn this tradition by returning to a more primordial experience of existence, one that is not framed by the theological concept of a transcendent God.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming similarly situates Heidegger’s rejection of theology within a broader critique of the Western philosophical tradition. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming argues that Heidegger’s rejection of metaphysics is also a rejection of the philosophical tradition’s reliance on theological concepts to explain Being. Hemming highlights Heidegger’s move to dismantle the primacy of concepts like substance and presence, which have been central to both philosophy and theology since Aristotle and Aquinas. Hemming, like Fuyarchuk, notes that Heidegger’s rejection of traditional theology is tied to his broader effort to rethink Being in a way that is not dependent on the metaphysical structures of Western thought.
- KEY SIMILARITY: Both authors emphasize Heidegger’s rejection of the entire Western metaphysical tradition, which they argue has been shaped by theological categories. For both Fuyarchuk and Hemming, Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is inextricably linked to his critique of theology, as both have relied on concepts like substance, presence, and essence to frame their understanding of Being. They agree that Heidegger’s project seeks to move beyond these concepts to develop a more fundamental, non-theological understanding of existence.
- The Role of Phenomenology in Overcoming Theological Categories
- Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming discuss how Heidegger’s phenomenological method serves as a means of overcoming the theological categories that have dominated Western thought. They explore how Heidegger uses phenomenology to return to the experience of Being itself, without the mediation of theological or metaphysical concepts.
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk emphasizes that Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein (Being-there) is a phenomenological method that seeks to uncover the structures of human existence as they are experienced in everyday life, without recourse to metaphysical or theological explanations. Fuyarchuk points out that for Heidegger, phenomenology allows for a direct encounter with Being, one that is not mediated by theological or philosophical abstractions. Through phenomenology, Heidegger aims to recover the original experience of Being that has been obscured by centuries of theological and metaphysical thinking.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming similarly argues that Heidegger’s use of phenomenology is key to his rejection of theology. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming focuses on how Heidegger’s phenomenological method provides a way of thinking about Being that does not rely on theological categories such as God, grace, or creation. Hemming emphasizes that Heidegger’s phenomenology is not concerned with metaphysical or theological questions about the nature of God but rather with the question of how Being reveals itself in everyday existence. Like Fuyarchuk, Hemming sees Heidegger’s phenomenology as a means of overcoming the theological structures that have dominated Western thought.
- KEY SIMILARITY: Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming highlight the central role of Heidegger’s phenomenological method in his rejection of theology. They agree that phenomenology allows Heidegger to bypass the theological and metaphysical categories that have traditionally shaped the understanding of Being. For both authors, Heidegger’s phenomenology is a tool for uncovering a more fundamental experience of existence, one that is not framed by theological or metaphysical abstractions.
- Heidegger’s Use of Theological Language
- Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming recognize that Heidegger’s philosophical project, despite its rejection of theology, retains certain theological resonances, particularly in his use of language that echoes Christian concepts.
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk discusses how Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly his analysis of concepts like “fallenness,” “guilt,” and “conscience,” borrows heavily from theological language, even as Heidegger seeks to secularize these terms. Fuyarchuk notes that Heidegger’s concept of “fallenness” resonates with the Christian notion of original sin, and his exploration of “guilt” and “conscience” echoes themes found in Christian moral theology. However, Fuyarchuk interprets Heidegger as reappropriating these terms for a purely philosophical inquiry into human existence, without relying on their theological content.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming, too, acknowledges that Heidegger’s philosophical language is often reminiscent of theological discourse. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming highlights how Heidegger uses terms like “fall” and “redemption” in a way that suggests a theological background, even though Heidegger himself rejects the theological framework. Hemming argues that Heidegger deliberately employs these terms to engage with the Christian tradition while reinterpreting them within the context of his existential ontology. Like Fuyarchuk, Hemming sees Heidegger as reworking these theological concepts to serve a philosophical, rather than a theological, purpose.
- KEY SIMILARITY: Both authors recognize that Heidegger’s philosophical project retains theological resonances, particularly in his use of language. They agree that while Heidegger rejects the theological content of these terms, he reappropriates them for a philosophical inquiry into human existence. Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming emphasize that Heidegger’s use of theological language is strategic, allowing him to engage with the Christian tradition while transforming its concepts for his own existential and phenomenological purposes.
- The Incomplete Break with Theology
- Both Fuyarchuk and Hemming acknowledge that despite Heidegger’s explicit rejection of theology, his work does not entirely escape theological influence. Both works recognize that Heidegger’s philosophy remains in dialogue with theology, even if it seeks to move beyond it.
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk emphasizes that Heidegger’s rejection of traditional Christian metaphysics is not a complete break with theological thought. He argues that Heidegger’s existential philosophy, while secular in its orientation, remains haunted by theological categories. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s concepts of fallenness, guilt, and conscience, as well as his emphasis on death and finitude
- Conclusion:
- In conclusion, both Andrew Fuyarchuk’s The Positive Task for Theology in Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being and Laurence Paul Hemming’s Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice share key similarities in their interpretation of Heidegger’s rejection of traditional Christian metaphysics and theology. Both authors emphasize Heidegger’s critique of the ontotheological structure that defines much of Western metaphysics, particularly its reliance on God as the ultimate ground of Being. They agree that Heidegger’s existential project represents a decisive break from this tradition and that his philosophy aims to uncover a more primordial understanding of Being, free from theological or metaphysical abstractions.
- Additionally, both Fuyarchuk and Hemming explore Heidegger’s use of theological language and concepts such as “fallenness,” “guilt,” and “redemption,” recognizing that while Heidegger reappropriates these terms for philosophical purposes, they remain deeply tied to theological resonances. They both see Heidegger’s phenomenological method as a means of overcoming the theological categories that have dominated Western thought and as a way to return to the lived experience of Being itself.
- Finally, both works acknowledge that Heidegger’s rejection of theology is not an entirely clean break. Despite Heidegger’s attempt to move beyond theology, his philosophy remains in dialogue with theological concepts, even as he seeks to reinterpret and transform them. For both Fuyarchuk and Hemming, Heidegger’s existential analysis cannot fully escape its theological heritage, even as it strives for a new, secular understanding of Being.
- In essence, while Heidegger’s project is framed as an atheistic departure from the Christian metaphysical tradition, both authors agree that his work is still haunted by the theological categories it seeks to leave behind. They highlight the tensions within Heidegger’s thought between his rejection of theology and his continued engagement with its language and concepts, making Heidegger’s relationship with theology more complex and layered than a simple rejection.
- Disagreements
- While both works offer valuable interpretations of Heidegger’s complex relationship with theology, they diverge on several critical points, especially regarding the depth of Heidegger’s atheism, his use of theological language, and whether his philosophy maintains a role for theological discourse. Below is an expanded and more detailed discussion of the key disagreements between the two works:
- Heidegger’s Atheism: A Rejection or a Nuanced Engagement with Theology?
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk’s dissertation posits that while Heidegger critiques traditional Christian metaphysics and theology, his existential philosophy still leaves room for a “positive task” for theology. According to Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s work is not a complete rejection of theology but rather a complex engagement with it. Fuyarchuk believes that Heidegger’s existential analytic and his focus on concepts like “Being,” “fallenness,” and “conscience” contain significant theological resonances, especially when interpreted through a lens that considers Heidegger’s rejection of objectifying metaphysical frameworks. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s philosophy opens up new possibilities for rethinking theological concepts, suggesting that his critique of traditional metaphysics is not the same as a wholesale dismissal of theological inquiry. Theology, in Fuyarchuk’s view, can find new meaning in Heidegger’s work, particularly when it is reconceived outside the bounds of traditional ontotheology.
- Hemming’s Position: In contrast, Hemming presents a much more radical interpretation of Heidegger’s atheism. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming argues that Heidegger’s rejection of theology is definitive and unambiguous. According to Hemming, Heidegger’s entire project is structured around the refusal of a theological voice in philosophy, especially the theological concepts of a transcendent God and a metaphysical grounding for Being. Hemming sees Heidegger as committed to dismantling ontotheology and developing a radically secular philosophy that stands in opposition to traditional Christian metaphysics. Hemming insists that Heidegger’s atheism is not merely a critique of theology but a complete philosophical shift that seeks to remove theology’s influence from the fundamental questions of Being and existence.
- KEY DISAGREEMENT: The fundamental disagreement here lies in how each author views Heidegger’s relationship to theology. Fuyarchuk interprets Heidegger’s critique as creating space for a renewed, non-metaphysical theology, while Hemming argues that Heidegger’s project is a total rejection of theological thought. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s atheism is nuanced and still open to theological reinterpretation, whereas Hemming sees it as a clear and decisive break from theology.
- The Role of Theological Language in Heidegger’s Philosophy
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk argues that Heidegger’s use of theological language—terms like “fallenness,” “guilt,” “conscience,” and “redemption”—is not just residual but deliberate. He contends that while Heidegger secularizes these concepts, he does so in a way that leaves them open to theological reinterpretation. Fuyarchuk sees this as evidence that Heidegger’s philosophy remains in dialogue with theology, even as he seeks to reframe these terms in existential and phenomenological terms. According to Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s continued use of these theological terms implies that Heidegger has not fully abandoned theological discourse; instead, he is engaged in a process of rethinking and reinterpreting theological ideas to fit into his broader existential framework. Thus, Heidegger’s language is not merely a sign of his rejection of theology but a potential bridge between philosophy and theology.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming strongly disagrees with this interpretation. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming argues that Heidegger’s use of theological language is strategic but ultimately secular in intent. He contends that Heidegger deliberately employs theological terms to expose the limitations of theological discourse, not to leave room for a renewed theological dialogue. For Hemming, Heidegger’s use of terms like “fallenness” and “guilt” are not gestures toward theology but are rather part of his project to deconstruct the Christian metaphysical tradition. Heidegger repurposes these terms to show how they can function within an atheistic existential framework, severing their ties to the theological concepts they traditionally signify. For Hemming, Heidegger’s use of theological language does not imply any continued engagement with theology but is a method of critiquing and rejecting its influence on Western thought.
- KEY DISAGREEMENT: Fuyarchuk believes that Heidegger’s use of theological language is evidence of an ongoing, albeit transformed, engagement with theology. Hemming, on the other hand, interprets Heidegger’s use of this language as a deliberate strategy to secularize and dismantle theological concepts, with no intention of preserving any theological meaning. This disagreement highlights the fundamental difference in how the two authors interpret Heidegger’s relationship to the theological vocabulary he employs.
- The Status of Redemption in Heidegger’s Philosophy
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk explores how Heidegger’s existential philosophy, despite its secular orientation, still deals with themes traditionally associated with Christian theology, such as “fallenness” and “redemption.” He suggests that Heidegger’s understanding of redemption can be reinterpreted in light of his existential analytic. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s focus on Dasein’s confrontation with death and finitude creates the possibility for an authentic mode of existence, which can be seen as a form of existential redemption. This mode of redemption, however, is not tied to the transcendent God of Christian theology but rather emerges from Dasein’s own relationship to its Being and its acknowledgment of finitude. Fuyarchuk sees Heidegger’s philosophy as offering a secular form of redemption, one that is immanent and grounded in human existence rather than divine intervention.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming disagrees entirely with the notion that Heidegger’s philosophy contains any form of redemption, secular or otherwise. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming argues that Heidegger explicitly rejects the Christian concept of redemption and does not seek to replace it with a secular equivalent. For Hemming, Heidegger’s focus on death and finitude is not a form of existential redemption but a radical acceptance of the limits of human existence without any hope of salvation, either divine or secular. Hemming sees Heidegger’s atheism as a refusal to offer any kind of redemptive narrative, instead emphasizing the stark reality of Being-toward-death. Any attempt to read Heidegger’s philosophy as offering a form of redemption, in Hemming’s view, misunderstands the fundamental nature of Heidegger’s existential analysis.
- KEY DISAGREEMENT: Fuyarchuk interprets Heidegger’s existential philosophy as offering a potential for existential redemption through authenticity and the acceptance of finitude, whereas Hemming insists that Heidegger’s philosophy rejects all notions of redemption, including secular forms. For Hemming, Heidegger’s atheism is a complete renunciation of the Christian redemptive narrative, while Fuyarchuk sees Heidegger’s philosophy as retaining a transformative possibility.
- Theological Reinterpretation vs. Complete Secularization
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: Fuyarchuk views Heidegger’s work as creating a space for reinterpreting theological concepts within a non-metaphysical framework. He argues that Heidegger’s critique of theology is not an outright dismissal of all theological reflection but rather an invitation to rethink how theology might engage with the question of Being in ways that avoid the pitfalls of traditional metaphysics. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s work on Being, particularly his engagement with poetic language and non-objectifying thought, suggests new avenues for theology to explore, especially in relation to faith and existence. This “positive task” for theology, as Fuyarchuk calls it, involves moving beyond ontotheology but does not require abandoning theological thought altogether.
- Hemming’s Position: Hemming rejects the idea that Heidegger’s philosophy leaves any room for theological reinterpretation. In Heidegger’s Atheism, Hemming insists that Heidegger’s project is aimed at completely secularizing the discourse around Being and removing any theological presuppositions from philosophical inquiry. Hemming interprets Heidegger’s atheism as a complete renunciation of theological thought, including any attempts to reinterpret or reformulate theology in light of Heidegger’s existential analysis. For Hemming, Heidegger’s work is an argument for the sufficiency of philosophy without theology, and any attempt to reintegrate theological concepts into Heidegger’s framework misunderstands the radical nature of his atheism.
- KEY DISAGREEMENT: Fuyarchuk believes Heidegger’s critique of theology opens up new possibilities for theological reinterpretation, while Hemming sees Heidegger’s project as a total rejection of theology. For Fuyarchuk, Heidegger’s work leaves room for a non-metaphysical form of theology, whereas Hemming argues that Heidegger’s atheism is a complete break from theological discourse.
- Heidegger’s Relationship with Aristotle and Scholasticism
- Fuyarchuk’s Position: In Fuyarchuk’s reading, Heidegger’s rejection of traditional metaphysics, particularly the Aristotelian-Scholastic framework of Christian theology, is seen as a challenge but not as a total break. Fuyarchuk highlights that Heidegger draws heavily from Aristotle, particularly in his discussions of phusis (nature) and Being. Heidegger, according to Fuyarchuk, seeks to overcome the distortions
- Conclusion
- In conclusion, the disagreements between Andrew Fuyarchuk’s The Positive Task for Theology in Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being and Laurence Paul Hemming’s Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice stem from fundamentally different interpretations of Heidegger’s relationship to theology and metaphysics. Fuyarchuk views Heidegger’s critique of traditional Christian metaphysics as creating space for a renewed, non-metaphysical theological engagement. He suggests that Heidegger’s existential analysis, while secular, still leaves room for theological reinterpretation, especially in terms of existential redemption, the use of theological language, and the possibility of a “positive task” for theology within Heidegger’s framework.
- On the other hand, Hemming presents Heidegger’s atheism as a radical and complete rejection of theology. For Hemming, Heidegger’s project aims to entirely secularize philosophical discourse, remove theological presuppositions from the question of Being, and dismantle the ontotheological tradition that had previously dominated Western thought. Hemming interprets Heidegger’s use of theological language as a strategic critique, not as an invitation for theological reinterpretation. He insists that Heidegger’s philosophy offers no space for concepts like redemption, whether in a theological or secular form.
- The primary points of divergence include:
- The completeness of Heidegger’s atheism: Fuyarchuk sees Heidegger’s atheism as nuanced, leaving room for theology, while Hemming argues that Heidegger’s atheism is a definitive break with theological thought.
- The role of theological language: Fuyarchuk believes Heidegger’s use of theological terms can be reinterpreted, whereas Hemming sees this as part of Heidegger’s critique and secularization of those terms.
- The possibility of redemption: Fuyarchuk reads Heidegger’s existential framework as offering a form of existential redemption, while Hemming firmly rejects this, emphasizing Heidegger’s rejection of any redemptive narrative.
- Ultimately, while both Fuyarchuk and Hemming deeply engage with Heidegger’s critique of Christian metaphysics, they diverge on whether this critique leaves room for theology to play a role in the ongoing philosophical inquiry into Being. Hemming argues that Heidegger’s atheism leaves no space for theology, whereas Fuyarchuk believes that Heidegger’s philosophy can be a platform for a reimagined theological discourse.